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Abstract
We wish to understand how companies should set the service-levels provided by their
operations. To this end, we use the measures of customer loyalty obtained in [5] to develop
simple, normative models for suppliers seeking to maximize long-run average proﬁts. The
results provide insight to suppliers on the level of service they should oﬀer.
1 Introduction
What should the line item ﬁll rate be? How should one set the expected delay in queue? These
are common questions that managers must answer as they set the service level in their oper-
ating systems. A common response is for companies to match the competition. Benchmarking
exercises and data drawn from trade associations allow managers to compare their operations
to competitors. Still, managers may wonder whether they have converged on the “right” service
level, whether there is something to be gained from deviating from the industry standard.
Traditional normative models in operations management are not of much help. Typically,
they use exogenously-deﬁned “good will” costs that depend on the magnitude of the service
failure: the number of stockouts, the average time spent in queue. There is wide recognition,
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however, that the use of these cost models does not adequately account for the damage done by
quality failures. Repeated failures, such as stockouts or delays in queue, may have a cumulative,
negative eﬀect on an individual customer’s satisfaction which these cost functions do not take
into account.
In a companion paper [5] we develop a detailed model of consumers’ long-term responses to
quality failures that is intended to help identify what the proper quality level should be. In our
model, a consumer repeatedly chooses among a set of suppliers, and the outcome of each visit
to a supplier is some (instantaneous) utility. The utility oﬀered by each supplier is, in fact, a
random variable that reﬂects the quality of that supplier’s oﬀering: whether or not there was a
stockout, how long the wait in queue was, how fresh the ﬁsh was that day. The consumer uses
a crude form of Bayesian revision to keep track of which of the suppliers she prefers. Each time
she enters the market, she myopically chooses the supplier that she thinks is most likely to be
best.
In this paper, we use the expressions developed in [5] to develop proﬁt models for suppliers
that explicitly integrate the revenue and cost consequences of their quality choices. The models
reﬂect the fact that poor service at a supplier leads to customer switching and that, when
aggregated, the switching behavior of individual customers obtains market shares for suppliers
that are dynamic and stochastic, rather than ﬁxed.
Given this stochastic view of market shares, we formulate suppliers’ objectives as the maxi-
mization of long-run average proﬁt, and we analyze the results of oligopoly competition in two
contexts: a generic cost model in which unit costs do not exhibit economies of scale, and a more
speciﬁc model of competing M/M/1 queues for which there are economies of scale. In both
models unit prices are ﬁxed, and suppliers compete on the basis of the quality levels that they
set.
In the ﬁrst case, in which costs are simply convex and increasing in the overall level of quality
oﬀered, we ﬁnd the following:
• Given symmetric competitors, there is a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and it is
symmetric.
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• Given asymmetric competitors equilibria are always asymmetric. In a duopoly, the com-
petitor with lower costs will invest its advantage to increase quality, capture market share,
and earn higher long-run average proﬁts.
• As the number of competitors m increases, competitive pressure drives quality levels to
increase. Still, consumers’ lack of quality information about providers allows suppliers to
earn positive proﬁts from current customers even as m →∞.
In the second case M/M/1 queues complete for the patronage of customers who are risk-neutral
with respect to system sojourn times. Here the set of equilibria is more diﬃcult to characterize.
Nevertheless, we are able to say a great deal about the nature of competitive equilibria, including
the following:
• In a symmetric duopoly there is a unique, pure-strategy equilibrium that is proﬁtable for
all suppliers, and it is symmetric.
• For m > 2 symmetric suppliers we have not been able to rule out the possibility of
asymmetric equilibria. We do show, however, that for any m there is exactly one symmetric
equilibrium in which suppliers earn positive average proﬁts.
• A closed-form expression for the quality level obtained in a symmetric equilibrium describes
it as a function of: 1) the underlying proﬁtability of the market, excluding congestion-
related costs to suppliers; 2) the number of competitors in the market; and 3) customer
expectations regarding congestion.
• As the number of competitors m increases, loss of economies of scale drives suppliers’
quality levels to decrease. This behavior stands in direct contrast to the case in which
there are no economies of scale.
Thus the results demonstrate that, given our underlying assumptions, there are natural forces
that drive competitors to adopt an industry quality standard, and they show how this industry
standard changes with the number of suppliers serving the market. Quality may increase or
decrease, depending on the nature of the industry’s cost structure.
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At the same time, the optimization models used to derive these results can be used by a
supplier to verify whether or not the current standard in its industry is consistent with the
long-run competitive equilibrium. To the extent that it is not, a supplier can use the models to
see better understand what its own quality strategy should be.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In §3, we develop our model of customer
reaction to service quality. Then §4 presents the analysis for industries that do not exhibit
economies of scale, and §5 presents that for competing M/M/1 queues, which do enjoy returns
to scale. Finally §6 discusses the results, as well as directions for future work.
2 Literature Review
The underlying model of consumer behavior is developed in a companion paper [5]. In that
paper we review literature that addresses customer responses to variation in product and service
quality and, more generally, the decision-making strategies people use when making sequential
choices under uncertainty.
In this paper, we use the model of consumer behavior to investigate suppliers’ decisions
regarding how best to set quality standards, and we highlight two recent streams of literature
that investigate the nature of quality competition and are closely related to this paper. The ﬁrst
group looks at quality competition more generally and represents the supplier’s cost of service
in a more highly stylized fashion. Recent examples of these papers include Karmarkar and
Pitbladdo [9], Tsay and Agrawal [21], and the references therein. The second group analyzes
queueing systems, and in them delay in queue or system sojourn time is typically deﬁned to be
the measure of quality, the shorter the better. Examples that analyze the case of a monopolist
service provider include papers by Mendelson and coworkers [16, 17, 4], Stidham [20], and van
Mieghem [22]. Mandelbaum and Shimkin [14] characterize equilibrium behavior of customer
abandonments from a monopolist. Other work, such as that of Li and Lee [12], Lederer and Li
[11], Ho and Zheng [8], Cachon and Harker [1], and Chayet and Hopp [2] perform competitive
analyses in which a supplier competes within an oligopoly.
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The analyses in both groups assume that, in equilibrium, consumers are well-informed about
(or have beliefs that are consistent with) the service level oﬀered by a supplier: each customer
knows suﬃcient statistics concerning the service quality at the various suppliers. In [12] cus-
tomers continually monitor queue lengths and jockey among suppliers; they exhibit no loyalty
towards suppliers. In the remaining work, customers know the expected quality level oﬀered by
all suppliers in equilibrium, and they frequent only the supplier that maximizes expected utility.
They do not modify their choice based on the history of the level of service they actually receive.
Our model falls somewhere in between these two extremes. Consumers are not well-informed
about quality levels, and they do not continually jockey among suppliers. In the short run they
remain “loyal” and stay with one supplier. But they do respond to the history of the service
they actually receive, and the resulting equilibria are ones in which consumers continue to switch
among suppliers.
The paper closest in spirit to ours is Hall and Porteus [7], which develops models in which
inventory and queueing systems compete on the basis of service quality. (For an earlier, related
paper see also Smallwood and Conlisk [19].) They show that when one ﬁrm has an advantage
of more loyal customers – with lower probabilities of switching upon a service failure – then it
is optimal for the ﬁrm to oﬀer a lower level of quality than its competitor.
The paper also explicitly models customers switching among suppliers, but it diﬀers from
this paper in two respects. First, it considers dynamic policies in which suppliers may change
service quality in response to short-term changes in market share. We consider only static quality
policies in which each supplier decides on a quality level and maintains it. Our stationary quality
policies are simple to implement, and they are intended to be consistent with industry practice,
which typically sets stationary targets for ﬁll rates and queueing delays. Nevertheless, they
clearly may not perform as well as more dynamic policies. Second, in the models of [7] customer
switching behavior is a function of both service quality and an exogenously deﬁned loyalty factor.
In our underlying model of consumer behavior, loyalty is completely (endogenously) driven by
supplier quality.
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3 Model of Customer Loyalty and Supplier Quality
Suppose there are m suppliers indexed i ∈ {1, . . . , m} that serve a market with n consumers,
and at regular time intervals t = 1, 2, . . . each consumer patronizes one of the suppliers. Because
there is inherent uncertainty in the process of delivering the product or service, the utility of
the good provided by supplier i to consumer j at t is a random variable, U i,jt .
3.1 The Relationship between Quality and Utility
While the quality of each item or service encounter is uncertain, each supplier can control the
overall level of utility it provides, and for each supplier this choice of a “quality level” manifests
itself in the choice of a distribution for U i,jt . In this paper we make two fundamental assumptions
that limit the nature of the variation:
(A1) All customers derive the same utility from the same physical experience.
(A2) The sequence of utilities that any customer obtains from a supplier is i.i.d..
The ﬁrst assumption allows us to translate any physical measure of the distribution of quality,
such as the probability of a stockout or the delay in queue, directly into a distribution of
utility. The second implies that each supplier’s choice of a quality distribution is a strategic
decision. Supplier i must choose its particular quality distribution once, before consumers enter
the market, and then live with the consequences.
Together the assumptions allow us to describe a supplier’s quality choice as a single dis-
tribution of utility U i with mean µi

= E[U i]. We may think of physical measures of system
performance and of the resulting customer utility in similar terms, although for consumers that
are risk averse with respect to the physical measure of service quality the two need not be iden-
tical. For example, suppose that a physical measure of system quality is normally distributed
but that the customer is risk averse. Then two service providers that oﬀered the same mean
level of the physical quantity, but diﬀerent levels of variability, would have diﬀerent – and not
necessarily normally distributed – U i’s. Furthermore, the supplier with the lower variance would
provide a higher expected utility, µi.
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3.2 Individual Consumer Response
We next deﬁne the choice behavior of an arbitrary consumer. She enters the market at time 0
with an initial level of satisfaction for each of the suppliers, Si0, i = 1, . . . , m. At time t = 1 she
patronizes the supplier with which she is most satisﬁed: i = argmax{Sjt−1 : j = 1, . . . , m} and
obtains utility according to a realization of U i. Given this realization, at t = 1 she updates her
satisfaction with the m suppliers as follows,
Sit = S
i
t−1 + U
i − µ∗ and Sjt = Sjt−1 for all j = i , (1)
where µ∗ is the level of utility at which she is “satisﬁed” with the supplier’s performance. (To
be consistent with A1, we assume that all consumers have the same µ∗.) If U i > µ∗, then the
consumer’s satisfaction with i increases, while if U i < µ∗, then her satisfaction with i decreases.
Again at t = 2 – and at each t thereafter – the consumer chooses supplier i = argmax{Sjt−1 :
j = 1, . . . , m} and updates her satisfaction with the suppliers using (1). Note that while all
customers have the same preferences, diﬀerences in initial beliefs and random variation in actual
experiences ultimately make each customer’s sequence of choices unique.
Remark This model of customer choice is consistent with the model of consumer learning
developed in Gans [5]. It is also a direct analogue to a version of “Cumulative Utility Consumer
Theory” presented in Gilboa and Pazgal [6]. In [5], the customer tests the simple hypothesis
that a supplier has a “good” quality distribution against the simple alternative that is has a
“bad” one, and her subjective probability estimate that a supplier i is good, rather than bad,
corresponds to her satisfaction Sit in this paper. The normalizing factor µ
∗ is sometimes called
the “aspiration level” of the customer, and in [5] it corresponds to the average quality-level at
which the consumer cannot statistically distinguish whether the supplier is good or bad. For
the purposes of this paper, µ∗ is not strictly needed, since without loss of generality we might
have shifted the distributions U i by µ∗. We maintain it for expositional convenience. 
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3.3 Two Characterizations of Customer Loyalty
In the short run, a consumer may stay with her current supplier for several periods. As long
as her satisfaction for supplier i remains above that of the other suppliers, she will continue to
patronize supplier i. As soon her satisfaction with i drops below that of another, however, she
will switch to the competitor.
Suppose a customer most prefers supplier i at time t. Then Sit = max{Sjt : j = 1, . . . , m}.
Let k = argmax{Sjt : j = 1, . . . , m; j = i} be the satisfaction of the “next-best” supplier and
bit = S
i
t−Skt be the balance of “good will” that the customer has for supplier i at time t. In turn,
deﬁne τ it = inf{s : Sit+s < Skt } to be the number of periods after which the customer switches
from i to k. We call τ it the duration of the customer’s remaining sojourn at supplier i, as well
as the duration of her remaining short-term loyalty, and we note that it is a stopping time for a
random walk with increments (U i − µ∗) and stopping boundary bit. Using Wald’s equation, the
following result is immediate:
Lemma 1 (Gans [5]) Given assumptions A1 and A2, suppose var(U i) < ∞. Then E[τ it ] < ∞
if and only if µi < µ
∗. Furthermore, when µi < µ∗
E[τ it ] =
bit + E[Sτ it − bit]
µ∗ − µi ≥
bit
µ∗ − µi . (2)
After the consumer leaves supplier i she may spend many periods patronizing i’s competitors.
At some future time, however, she may return to i. Indeed, if switching among suppliers is
frequent, then supplier i may be interested in the long-run relative frequency with which the
customer chooses i.
Consider the long-run switching behavior of an arbitrary customer. Let π(s) be the index
of the supplier chosen by the consumer in period s and fi

= limt→∞ 1t
∑t
s=1 1{π(s) = i} denote
the limiting relative frequency with which the consumer chooses supplier i.
Lemma 2 (Gilboa and Pazgal [6] and Gans [5]) Given assumptions A1 and A2, suppose −∞ <
µi < µ
∗ and var(U i) < ∞ for i = 1, . . . , m. Then with probability one fi exist for i = 1, . . . , m ,
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and
fi(µi, µ−i) =
1/(µ∗ − µi)∑m
j=1 1/(µ
∗ − µj) =
1
1 + (µ∗ − µi)∆ , (3)
where µ−i = {µj, j = i} and ∆ = ∑j =i(µ∗ − µj)−1. Furthermore,
∂fi
∂µi
=
fi (1− fi)
(µ∗ − µi) and
∂2fi
∂µ2i
=
2 fi (1− fi)2
(µ∗ − µi)2 . (4)
Equation (3) describes the long-run share of a customer’s purchases as a function of her aspiration
level and the suppliers’ quality levels. In the oligopoly games developed in §4 and §5, this
customer share will drive supplier i’s revenues and costs. Equation (4), which will be used to
verify optimality conditions, shows that supplier i’s share is convex and increasing in µi.
Observe that µ∗ plays a special role in both Lemma 1 and 2. It is the level of quality at
which a supplier can guarantee the loyalty of a consumer. In Lemma 1 µ∗ is the quality level at
which the expected duration of a customer’s sojourn at a supplier becomes inﬁnite. This limit is
independent of the consumer’s initial level satisfaction. Similarly, in Lemma 2 it is the quality
level at which the long-run “shares” of customer no longer exists. If there exists a µi ≥ µ∗,
then once a customer begins patronizing supplier i she is expected to remain loyal forever. For
a more general discussion and interpretation of these results, see [5].
Remark In the analysis that follows, we use the lower bound of (2) as if it were an equality.
In [5] we oﬀer evidence that the behavior of E[τ ] itself is roughly that of the bound: E[τ ] =
O(1/(µ∗−µi)). Furthermore, we note that the long-run characterization of fi is the composition
of O(1/(µ∗−µi)) terms for the various suppliers. As we shall see in §4, there is a close connection
between these short and long-run views of customer loyalty. 
3.4 Supplier Revenues
We assume that prices are ﬁxed and that each customer visit yields a supplier $r of revenue.
Therefor, to determine a supplier’s revenues we need only derive the number of customers that
patronize a supplier.
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Let πj(t) be customer j’s choice of supplier in period t, and let nit be the number of customers
that patronize supplier i in period t. Then given assumptions A1 and A2, we can use Lemma 2
to derive the long-run average number of customers that patronize supplier i:
Corollary 1 Given assumptions A1 and A2, suppose −∞ < µi < µ∗ and var(U i) < ∞ for
i = 1, . . . , m. Then
lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
s=1
nis = limt→∞
1
t
t∑
s=1
n∑
j=1
1{πj(s) = i} =
n∑
j=1
lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
s=1
1{πj(s) = i} = n f(µi, µ−i) . (5)
Thus, with identical customers long-run average market share is a multiple of the long-run share
of an arbitrary customer. Note that the interchange of limit and summation is justiﬁed by the
fact that 0 ≤ ∑nj=1 1{πj(s) = i} ≤ n is bounded for every s.
Remark While we will not require the result in this paper, one may also be interested in the
limiting distribution, limt→∞ 1t
∑t
s=1 1{nis = x}. For example, if we were to assume that in any
period t the distribution of utility obtained by one customer is independent of that of the next,
then it should not be diﬃcult to show that the limiting random variable is binomially distributed
with parameters n and fi(µi, µ−i). 
3.5 Supplier Costs and Information Requirements
The assumption that supplier i’s quality distribution U i is ﬁxed allows us to derive the long-run
average of its market share. This assumption also has important implications for supplier i’s
actions. First, it limits the supplier to consider only stationary quality policies. As we noted in
the literature review, we do not consider policies, such as those investigated by Hall and Porteus
[7], that dynamically change the service level in response to market conditions at time t.
Furthermore, to execute a stationary quality policy, a supplier must be able to dynamically
change its capacity in response to changes in the size of its customer base, nit. For example,
in a queueing system, as the number of customers patronizing supplier i changes from period
t to period t + 1, so will the arrival rate of customers. To maintain the same sojourn-time
distribution across periods, supplier i must be able to change its rate of service.
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The ability to maintain a stationary quality distribution also has important implications for
the information required by a supplier to operate. If the supplier is to match capacity to demand
in each period, then it must know what demand will be, and we assume that in each period each
supplier knows how many consumers in the market are current customers. This implies that each
period a supplier knows the numbers of new customers that arrive and defecting customers that
leave – and it knows these numbers early enough to be able to adjust its capacity accordingly.
We deﬁne supplier i’s cost of delivering the product or service to an arriving customer as
a function $ci(·) that is determined at least in part by the overall level of quality chosen, µi.
If there are no economies of scale in production, then ci(·) does not vary with nit, and we will
assume ci(µi) is increasing and convex in µi. In this case a fairly general analysis is possible.
(See Section 4.)
With economies of scale, however, there are two complications that make the behavior of
ci(·) more complex. First, given ﬁxed µi, period-to-period changes in nit drive changes in unit
costs. Second and more fundamentally, an increase in µi aﬀects average cost in at least two
ways: it has a direct eﬀect that drives up unit costs; and it has an indirect eﬀect, through
fi(µi, µ−i), that drives up long-run average market share and lowers unit costs. The complexity
of this relationship makes a general analysis of the case “economies of scale” impossible, and we
are reduced to analyzing speciﬁc functional forms for ci(·). In Section 5 we therefor analyze one
speciﬁc case that is of special interest to us, that of competing M/M/1 queues.
4 No Economies of Scale: General Model
In this section we analyze systems in which costs are convex and increasing in the average level of
quality oﬀered and which do not exhibit economies of scale, and we consider proﬁt-maximization
under two diﬀerent information regimes. In the ﬁrst, an individual supplier knows little about
its competitors, but it knows the nature of an individual consumer’s response to its unilateral
changes in quality (2), and it seeks to set quality to maximize the expected proﬁts from each
customer sojourn. In the second, the supplier knows much more. In particular, it knows its
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competitors’ cost functions, as well as the form of (3).
In both settings, we can derive the fundamentals of a supplier’s quality strategy. In the case
of unilateral quality changes, the supplier’s proﬁt function is pseudo-concave in the quality level
chosen. If in addition costs are strictly convex, then there is a unique proﬁt-maximizing quality
level that a supplier should choose. For the case of oligopoly competition, we obtain analogous
equilibrium results. Each competitor’s reaction function is pseudo-concave, so there exists at
least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium. This structure provides the foundation for the results
summarized in the introduction.
4.1 When a Supplier Sets Quality Unilaterally
Consider a supplier that operates in the absence of competitive information. It knows its own
cost function, as well as (current and potential future) consumers’ short-term responses to its
quality, the lower bound of (2). Suppose the supplier wishes to maximize the expected proﬁts
from the sojourn of each customer that becomes a patron.
Recall that a customer pays $r per unit of time it remains with the supplier and that the cost
of providing service to a customer is $ ci(µi) per customer per unit of time and is independent of
the number of customers being served. Then for a customer with initial balance of good will bit,
the supplier maximizes expected proﬁts of the sojourn by choosing its quality level as follows:
max
µi
{
Πi(µi)

= (r − ci(µi)) × bit / (µ∗ − µi)
}
. (6)
If ci(µi) is a convex function of µi, then r− ci(µi) is concave, and (r− ci(µi)) bit /(µ∗− µi) is
pseudo-concave in µi (see Mangasarian [15]). This implies (in the unconstrained case) that the
set of quality levels that maximize proﬁts is contiguous and satisﬁes the ﬁrst order optimality
conditions. In turn, for all µi above the set of proﬁt maximizers, Πi
′(µi) < 0, and for all µi
below the set of proﬁt maximizers, Πi
′(µi) > 0.
The ﬁrst order conditions are satisﬁed when the proﬁt due to an increase in the expected
sojourn time equals the marginal cost required to increase the level of service over the same
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period,
Πi
′(µi) = (r − ci(µi)) b
i
t
(µ∗ − µi)2 − c
′(µi)
bit
(µ∗ − µi) = 0 , (7)
or, equivalently, when
r − ci(µi)
µ∗ − µi − c
′(µi) = 0 . (8)
Observe that the ﬁrst order conditions (8) are independent of bit. Therefor, the quality
strategy for the supplier is quite simple. Because all customers have the same aspiration level µ∗,
the same quality level simultaneously maximizes expected proﬁts from all customers’ sojourns,
no matter what their prior satisfactions are for the supplier.
If in addition ci(·) is strictly convex, there is a unique proﬁt-maximizing level of quality:
Proposition 1 Suppose ci(µi) is strictly convex and increasing in µi. If there exists a minimum
average quality level, −∞ < µ < µ∗, oﬀered by the supplier and r − ci(µ) > 0, then there
exists a unique quality level, µ̂, that maximizes expected proﬁts from every customer sojourn.
Furthermore: i) if r − ci(µ∗) > 0 then µ̂ = µ∗; and ii) if r − ci(µ∗) ≤ 0 then µ̂ ∈ [µ, µ∗).
The proofs of most propositions can be found in the appendix.
Note that no matter what the form of the cost function is, when r − ci(µ∗) > 0 the objective
function (6) is unbounded, and our model breaks down. Formally, the expected duration of
customer loyalty is inﬁnite, and the supplier earns inﬁnite proﬁts. Ultimately, this is due to the
simplifying assumption underlying (2) that customers live forever.
In broader terms, if a supplier can aﬀord to oﬀer a quality level µ∗, then quality is no longer
the basis of competition. By oﬀering µ∗, a supplier locks in customer loyalty. In this case all
suppliers may oﬀer µ∗, and the focus of competition would shift to other arenas, such as eﬀorts
to attract new customers or product and service diﬀerentiation.
4.2 Quality Competition in an Oligopoly
We now turn to an analogous model of oligopoly competition. We assume that m ﬁrms compete
for the patronage of n identical consumers.
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Suppose, again, that each customer pays $ r per period to the appropriate supplier and that
the cost of providing service to a customer is $ ci(µi) per customer per period and is independent
of the number of customers being served. Then a supplier’s long-run average costs are directly
proportional to its average customer base, which from (5) is n fi(µi, µ−i).
Given ﬁxed quality levels for competitors, µ−i, supplier i solves
max
µi
{
Πmi (µi)

= (r − ci(µi)) × n fi(µi, µ−i)
}
(9)
to maximize its long-run average proﬁt. Here Πmi denotes supplier i’s proﬁt when m suppliers
compete in an oligopoly.
Again, when µ−i is ﬁxed and ci(µi) is convex in µi, then it is not diﬃcult to show that
Πmi (µi) is pseudo-concave in µi. The unit proﬁt, r − ci(µi) is concave, as before, and if we let
gi = 1/fi = 1+(µ
∗−µi)∆, then gi is linear and decreasing in µi. In turn, for µi < µ∗ the proﬁt,
(r − ci(µi))n / gi, is pseudo-concave in µi (see Mangasarian [15]). Therefore,
Proposition 2 Suppose the ci(·) are convex and increasing and that there exist −∞ < µi <
µi < µ
∗ such that µi ∈ [µi, µi], for i = 1, . . . , m. Then there exists a pure-strategy, Nash
equilibrium to the quality competition game.
Proof The strategy spaces of the suppliers are nonempty, compact, convex subsets of the real
line, and each supplier’s response function is quasi-concave in its quality level. Therefore from
Debreu [3] the result follows. 
The assumption that there exists a µ
i
> −∞ is mild. A reasonable assumption for µi would be
µi = {µ : r − ci(µ) = 0}. This is consistent with the assumptions r − ci(µi) > 0, r− ci(µ∗) < 0,
and c(·) increasing.
The ﬁrst order conditions are satisﬁed when the marginal increase in proﬁts due to an increase
in market share equals the marginal increase in cost over that share. Using (4) we have:
Πmi
′(µi) = (r − ci(µi))n fi (1− fi)
µ∗ − µi − c
′
i(µi)n fi = 0 , (10)
for all suppliers, i = 1, . . . , m.
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Note that the set of Nash equilibria includes
{(µ1, . . . , µm) : Πmi ′(µi) = 0 ∀i = 1, . . . , m} , (11)
the set of quality vectors for which the ﬁrst order conditions (10) hold for all i. It also may include
vectors with some elements on the boundary of the action space: {µi = µi ∩ Πmi ′(µi) ≤ 0} or
{µi = µi ∩ Πmi ′(µi) ≥ 0}.
One general problem with using the search for Nash equilibria as a method of strategic
analysis is that set of possible equilibrium points may be large. In this case one must justify
how competitors may converge on one of many possible equilibria.
Given our problem structure, we are able to show that the set of Nash equilibria is well
structured, however. In particular, when the suppliers’ technologies are identical, we can use
the ﬁrst order conditions (10) to prove the following.
Proposition 3 For i = 1, . . . , m, suppose that ci(·) ≡ c(·) is convex and increasing, that there
exist −∞ < µ < µ < µ∗ such that µi ∈ [µ, µ], and that r− c(µ) = 0. Then there exists a unique
pure strategy Nash equilibrium and it is symmetric.
Just as symmetric costs drive symmetric equilibria, asymmetric costs strongly drive equilibria
to be asymmetric. As the following proposition shows, when one supplier has a (percentage)
cost advantage over another, the two never choose the same quality level in equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Let ci(·) ≡ αic(·) for i = 1, . . . , m, where αi ∈ (0,∞) and c(·) is positive,
convex, and increasing. For each i suppose there exist µ
i
< µi < µ
∗ such that µi ∈ [µi, µi], and
that r − αic(µi) = 0.
i) For any m, consider arbitrary suppliers j and k. If αj < αk, then there is no equilibrium
with µj = µk such that Π
m
j
′(µj) = Πmk
′(µk) = 0.
ii) When m = 2, if α1 < α2 then any pure strategy equilibrium with Π
m
1
′(µ1) = Πm2
′(µ2) = 0
has µ1 > µ2. Furthermore Π
m
1 (µ1) > Π
m
2 (µ2).
Part (i) of the proposition shows that asymmetric equilibria will generally result from asym-
metric costs. Without more structure, however, it is diﬃcult to say more about the nature of
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the equilibria. Part (ii) adds the restriction that m = 2. In this case we can also say that for
any positive, convex, and increasing cost function, the supplier with a cost advantage will oﬀer
higher quality and earn higher proﬁts.
Remark Proposition 4 is an analogue to results in Lederer and Li [11] and a complement to
results in Hall and Porteus [7]. In our case a lower cost structure allows a supplier to increase
quality, customer loyalty, and average proﬁts. In [7] the authors show that, given customers are
a priori more loyal, a supplier can decrease quality and improve proﬁts. 
4.3 Relationship Between Oligopoly and Unilateral Solutions
A natural relationship exists between the model in which the supplier sets quality unilaterally
and the one in which it oﬀers the equilibrium-level of quality obtained in an oligopoly. As the
following proposition shows, the ﬁrst is a natural limit of the second:
Proposition 5 Suppose that: a) there exist −∞ < µ < µ < µ∗ such that for any m, µ ≤ µ
i
<
µi ≤ µ and µi ∈ [µi, µi] for i = 1, . . . , m; and b) for any i, ci(·) is positive, convex and increasing
and r − ci(µi) = 0. Let µ̂i be proﬁt-maximizing when the supplier acts unilaterally and µmi be a
quality level oﬀered by supplier i in an m-player oligopoly equilibrium.
i) For any ﬁxed m: if µ
i
< µ̂i, then µ
m
i < µ̂i; if µ̂i = µi then µ
m
i = µi as well.
ii) Given the case µmi < µ̂i, consider a sequence of equilibrium solutions for supplier i in
oligopolies with m = 2, 3, . . . suppliers. Then limm→∞ µmi = µ̂i.
iii) If in case (ii) the suppliers’ costs are symmetric, then the equilibrium quality of service
oﬀered in an oligopoly is pointwise increasing in m: Πmi
′(µi) = 0 ⇒ Πm+1i ′(µi) > 0.
Part (i) of the proposition implies that optimal quality levels that arise from unilateral action
strongly dominate those in symmetric oligopoly. The pseudo-concavity of (6) implies that the
set of µi’s that maximize (6) is a contiguous set. Therefor, for any m the entire set of unilateral
proﬁt maximizers must lie above any µmi that is obtained as a part of an oligopoly equilibrium.
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Part (ii) shows that as the number of competitors grows, the set of equilibrium quality
levels for supplier i converges to that which maximizes expected proﬁts from customer sojourns.
Furthermore, when the suppliers are symmetric there is a single, symmetric equilibrium and
all µmi ’s are identical; the “set” of equilibria is a point. Part (iii) shows that in this case the
equilibrium point can be seen as “rising” to the limit.
This limiting result has an intuitively appealing interpretation. When it sets quality uni-
laterally, the supplier uses (2) to maximize the expected proﬁt obtained from each, individual
customer sojourn. Implicitly, it is as if the supplier has one chance to serve a customer; once
she defects, she never returns. Oligopoly competition does not maximize the expected proﬁts
from each customer sojourn. Rather, it maximizes proﬁts in terms of long-run customer share,
fi, and implicitly recognizes that each customer comes back. As the number of competitors m
increases, however, share of customer decreases, and in the limit each supplier has zero customer
share. That is, in the limit the supplier again has just one chance to serve the customer.
Note that increased competition does not drive quality up so that r = ci(µ̂i). Rather, the
customer’s lack of information concerning i’s quality allows r − ci(µ̂i) > 0, and each customer
sojourn with supplier i earns positive proﬁts. For ﬁxed n, as m →∞ long-run average supplier
proﬁts do vanish, however, since i’s market share drops to zero. In the limit, the expected time
between customer visits to i becomes inﬁnite.
The proposition also shows that there is a clear incentive for a set of suppliers to coordinate
with each other by sharing operating information. For example, suppliers that do not recognize
(3) or are very small relative to the overall market eﬀectively maximize with (2) and oﬀer a higher
level of service. If suppliers recognize (3) to be the determinant of their revenues, however, they
can all lower their quality standards and increase proﬁts. Note that this implicit coordination
falls short of outright collusion; the cooperative solution to the symmetric game is µi = µi for
all i.
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4.4 The Oligopoly Model with Fixed Costs
If we include ﬁxed costs in the basic model, then the supplier’s objective becomes
max
µi
{
Πmi (µi)

= (r − ci(µi)) × n fi(µi, µ−i) − F
}
. (12)
where ci(µi) is the original unit cost function that is convex and increasing in µi, and F is some
positive constant that represents a ﬁxed, per-period expense paid by the supplier.
As (12) shows, the addition of these ﬁxed costs should not change the behavior of exist-
ing suppliers. Neither Πmi
′(µi) nor Πmi
′′(µi) depend on F , and expressions for both the ﬁrst
and second order conditions have nothing to do with ﬁxed costs. Thus, for suppliers that are
committed to competing in the market, ﬁxed costs mean little, and previous results hold: sym-
metric costs produce symmetric equilibria; asymmetric costs produce asymmetric equilibria; and
quality levels increase with the number of competitors.
Instead, the impact of ﬁxed costs is felt on the number of ﬁrms that can proﬁtably enter the
market. Given the assumptions of Propositions 3 and 4, a ﬁrm that has already entered the
market can always make a positive proﬁt. As m → ∞, supplier proﬁts drop to zero because
market share, rather than unit proﬁt, drops to zero. With a ﬁxed cost per period F , however,
there is a ceiling to the number of ﬁrms that can proﬁtably survive. Proposition 5 implies that,
with symmetric competitors, each additional entrant drives up quality, drives down market
share, and lowers each supplier’s proﬁts. In turn, there exists an m beyond which proﬁts before
ﬁxed costs are not large enough to cover F .
5 Economies of Scale: Competing M/M/1 Queues
When unit costs exhibit economies of scale, it becomes much more diﬃcult to analyze a general
formulation of the supplier’s problem. While a marginal increase in quality may increase unit
costs, it also will lead to an increase in market share, which may decrease unit costs. Neither of
these forces necessarily dominates the other, and it becomes diﬃcult to characterize the eﬀect
of economies of scale without making speciﬁc assumptions regarding the form of the supplier’s
cost function.
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For example, the introduction of ﬁxed costs into the model analyzed in §4 generates economies
of scale: unit costs in period t become ci(µi) + F/n
i
t, which decrease with n
i
t. Yet in this case
we saw that, given m suppliers are already competing in the market, economies of scale have no
eﬀect on the nature of competitive equilibria. In other cases, however, this is not true.
In particular, in the model of competing M/M/1 queues analyzed in this section, there exist
ﬁxed costs that behave slightly diﬀerently than those of §4. Given a ﬁxed level of service µi, the
supplier pays a ﬁxed cost “F (µi).” Increases in µi require higher ﬁxed costs, and the magnitude
of the ﬁxed cost is outcome of competition.
Even though the structure of this problem diﬀers only slightly from that of the ﬁxed-cost
model in §4, the results of competition diﬀer signiﬁcantly. While there is still evidence of
pressure for symmetric equilibria, that pressure does not appear to be as strong as before. More
importantly, we ﬁnd that as m increases service levels decrease, due to loss of economies of scale.
5.1 Model of Competing M/M/1 Queues
We represent a supplier as operating an M/M/1 queue with arrival rate λit and service rate ξ
i
t.
We assume that in period t, the arrival rate is proportional to the size of supplier i’s customer
base, and without loss of generality we let λit ≡ nit and λ ≡ n. The processing rate in period t
is controlled by the supplier to maintain a ﬁxed level of service.
We deﬁne the utility oﬀered by the supplier to be a function of the sojourn time in the system.
In some instances, such as some computer applications, system responsiveness is determined by
sojourn time, and the measure is appropriate. In others, such as telephone call centers, time
spent “on hold” is the more appropriate measure of service, and delay in queue is a better ﬁt.
While the use of sojourn time in anM/M/1 queue is stylized, its essential feature – exponentially-
distributed sojourn times – may also be thought of as an analytically tractable approximation
for delay. For example, it is well known that in heavy traﬃc the distribution of delay in more
complex, multi-server systems is also exponentially distributed (see Wolﬀ [23]).
To satisfy assumption A1 of the model, suppliers must be able to maintain stationary quality
distributions. Since sojourn time in an M/M/1 queue is exponentially distributed with mean
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(ξit−λit)−1, as λit changes, the supplier must change ξit to maintain a stationary exponential distri-
bution. Thus, using sojourn time, stationary quality strategies are quite simple to characterize:
maintain constant ξit − λit.
Suppose that customers are risk-neutral with respect to system sojourn time. That is, their
disutility grows linearly with the time spent in the system. Therefore, the realization of a sojourn
time is identical to the realization of the negative of utility, since utility decreases with the wait,
and expected quality level is
µi = − 1
ξit − λit
, (13)
the negative of the expected sojourn time. Note that µi < 0.
Then solving (13) for ξit we have
ξit = λ
i
t −
1
µi
. (14)
Again, given a ﬁxed service level µi, in any period t supplier i simply sets ξ
i
t to be − 1µi units
above λit. In eﬀect, given a target service level the supplier makes a ﬁxed investment in “excess
capacity” that remains constant in the face of a changing arrival rates. As we noted previously,
this diﬀers from the ﬁxed-cost F of §4, which was an all-or-nothing proposition. Here, investment
in excess capacity − 1
µi
increases with service quality.
Let the revenue per arrival be $r and the cost of service capacity be $ci per unit per period.
Given ﬁxed µi, average proﬁts are straightforward to calculate using (14) and Corollary 1:
Πmi (µi) = limt→∞
1
t
t∑
s=1
(r λis − ci ξis) = (r − ci) limt→∞
1
t
t∑
s=1
λis +
ci
µi
= (r − ci)λ fi(µi, µ−i) + ci
µi
.
Then the supplier’s proﬁt maximization problem is
max
µi
{
Πmi (µi)

= (r − ci)λ fi(µi, µ−i) + ci
µi
}
. (15)
Remark Risk aversion can be introduced into the model in a straightforward fashion, though
it requires that we deﬁne an appropriate form of (dis)utility function for waiting. For ex-
ample, suppose a customer has constant relative risk aversion with parameter α (see Kreps
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[10]). Then a sojourn time s induces disutility (−eαs), and the expected utility of waiting is
µi =
∫∞
0 (−eαs) (ξit −λit)e−(ξit−λit)sds = − ξ
i
t−λit
ξit−λit−α . Solving for ξ
i
t we ﬁnd ξ
i
t = λ
i
t +αµi/(µi +1),
and the supplier’s problem becomes: maxµi
{
Πmi (µi)

= (r − ci)λ fi(µi, µ−i) − ci αµiµi +1
}
. 
5.2 Results of Oligopoly Competition
Inspection of (15) shows that it is the sum of a positive, convex, and increasing term, (r −
ci)λ fi(µi, µ−i) and a negative, concave, and decreasing term, ci/µi. Given this form, the equi-
libria that obtain from oligopoly competition are more diﬃcult to characterize.
While it is not diﬃcult to numerically ﬁnd asymmetric equilibria, we have not been able to
ﬁnd asymmetric equilibria in which all suppliers make a positive proﬁt. Furthermore, for the
case m = 2, we can prove that no such (interior) equilibrium exists.
Proposition 6 When m = 2 and c1 = c2 = c, there exists no asymmetric equilibrium µ1 = µ2
for which Πm1
′(µ1) = Πm2
′(µ2) = 0 and both suppliers earn strictly positive proﬁts.
Similarly, when the suppliers have asymmetric costs, it is possible to show that there exists no
interior symmetric equilibrium. We omit a formal statement, however, due to space constraints.
For symmetric competitors with common unit costs, ci ≡ c, it is not diﬃcult to show that
only one symmetric equilibrium exists. To do so, we develop an upper bound on the quality
level that might reasonably be oﬀered by the suppliers. First, note that for any ﬁxed arrival
rate λit, a supplier earns zero proﬁt when r λ
i
t = c ξ
i
t, and
−µ = 1
ξit − λit
=
1
(r/c − 1)λit
. (16)
Second note that the right hand side of (16) is decreasing in λit. That is, the minimum expected
sojourn time that can be oﬀered on a breakeven basis decreases with the arrival rate; equivalently,
the maximum possible level of quality that can be oﬀered proﬁtably is increasing in λit. This
reﬂects the economies of scale in inherent in queueing systems.
Using λ as an upper bound on λit, we can deﬁne
−µ = 1
(r/c − 1)λ (17)
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to be a reasonable upper bound on the quality level that a supplier would oﬀer. This is the
highest level of quality that could be proﬁtably oﬀered by a monopolist supplier. In the context
of oligopoly competition, a supplier that oﬀered quality µ would actually lose money, since the
arrival rate would be something less than λ.
Given µ, we can then characterize the symmetric equilibrium. The following proposition
states this formally. Note that it drops the i subscripts.
Proposition 7 Suppose there exist m symmetric queues and that µ is deﬁned as in (17). When-
ever µ < µ∗ there exists a single symmetric equilibrium that is proﬁtable:
µ = mµ
 m
2 (m− 1)
1 +
√√√√1 − 4 (m− 1
m2
) (
µ∗
µ
) . (18)
Thus for any m there exists one proﬁtable, symmetric equilibrium. Furthermore, together
Propositions 6 and 7 imply that when m = 2 the symmetric equilibrium is unique.
Note that the term in square brackets in (18) is greater than one and reﬂects the fact that
µ < mµ is necessary for suppliers to be proﬁtable. More generally, we have:
Corollary 2 The symmetric equilibrium (18) is decreasing in m.
Thus, as m increases the equilibrium behavior of competing M/M/1 queues is the opposite of
that of the suppliers in §4: service levels decrease, rather than increase. As m increases, each
supplier’s 1/mth of the market provides a smaller customer base, and the loss of volume prompts
suppliers to lower ﬁxed costs – and with them service levels.
6 Discussion
Our model of consumer behavior provides simple, closed-form expressions which allow us to
clearly characterize both the source and the eﬀect of the revenue response to changes in a
supplier’s quality level. In turn, the competitive analysis presented in the paper provides insights
into how suppliers should set quality levels when quality cannot be completely controlled and is
inherently uncertain.
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The equilibrium results generally reﬂect forces that drive competitors to match the compe-
tition, particularly when economies of scale have been exhausted. Furthermore, when a speciﬁc
functional form for suppliers’ costs is used, the analysis allows a supplier to calculate what the
target level of quality should be in equilibrium.
If a supplier believes that competitors will not respond (quickly) to its change in quality,
then it may also use reaction functions, such as (10) and (15) to determine an “oﬀ-equilibrium”
strategy as well. (The functions can be used to maximize average proﬁts no matter what
quality levels the other suppliers oﬀer.) The information required by i is as follows: an estimate
of customer preferences, µ∗; its own cost function, ci(·); it’s current quality level µi and market
share fi; and details about the form of optimization problem (9). In particular, given a knowledge
µi and fi supplier i can use (3) to back out ∆, the required measure of competitive intensity,
without having to know the actual quality levels of individual competitors.
More broadly, we think of the approach taken in this paper as one method of extending the
traditional framework of hierarchical production planning to include quality attributes. After
using a stylized model to determine the appropriate service level, a more detailed analysis can
be performed that explicitly accounts for the many complexities involved in actually operating
the system.
For example, inbound telephone call centers are typically operated to minimize costs, subject
to a service-level constraint placed on the time calls spend waiting in on hold. Production
planning in calls centers is actually carried out at several hierarchical levels – from long-term
hiring and training plans, to weekly workforce scheduling plans, down to schemes for real-time
routing of calls as they arrive. The service-level constraint is most often deﬁned on an ad hoc
basis, but it should not be. Stylized models, such as the model of competing M/M/1 queues
presented in this paper, are tractable and often capture the essence of the economies of scale
inherent in larger, more complex systems. They can be used to determine the level of service
that should be provided.
This type of analysis can also be applied to other systems in which suppliers set static service-
level targets and dynamically vary capacity to meet the target. In particular, inventory systems
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are another domain in which the analysis would be appropriate. In them, the service target
is the line-item ﬁll rate, and the supplier varies capacity from period to period by changing
the inventory level. Because costs do not necessarily vary linearly with demand, however, the
steady-state distribution of demand – rather than just the long-term average – is required to
characterize long-run average costs.
The analysis may also be enriched in a number ways. For example, a supplier may use
common capacity to serve multiple classes of customer, each with it’s owns µ∗. In this case,
the supplier must make more complex, joint capacity sizing and allocation decisions. Similarly,
suppliers may ultimately manage price and quality together. Many of the papers cited in the
literature review have analyzed both capacity allocation and price controls, although they have
not addressed these factors in the context of customer switching behavior.
Finally, the underlying choice model of [5] may be further developed and extended. For
example, switching costs are likely to systematically change customer loyalty behavior. Similarly,
advertising and word of mouth also inﬂuence customer satisfaction and are likely to inﬂuence
switching behavior. Furthermore, the underlying assumption that suppliers’ quality levels are
stationary may be revisited. In particular, in industries that enjoy rapid technological advances,
supplier quality may be systematically improving, and expectations of improvement may induce
customers to test alternative suppliers more frequently.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof We begin by diﬀerentiating (7).
Πi
′′(µi) = − ci
′(µi) bit
(µ∗ − µi)2 +
2 (r − ci(µi)) bit
(µ∗ − µi)3 −
ci
′′(µi) bit
(µ∗ − µi) −
ci
′(µi) bit
(µ∗ − µi)2 (19)
=
2
(µ∗ − µi)
[
(r − ci(µi)) bit
(µ∗ − µi)2 −
ci
′(µi) bit
(µ∗ − µi)
]
− ci
′′(µi) bit
(µ∗ − µi) (20)
=
2
(µ∗ − µi)Πi
′′(µi) − ci
′′(µi) bit
(µ∗ − µi) . (21)
Suppose that an interior point µi ∈ (µ, µ∗) maximizes Π. Since Π is pseudoconcave, Πi′(µi) =
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0, and from (21) we see Πi
′′(µi) < 0, since
ci′′(µi) bit
(µ∗−µi) > 0 for strictly concave ci(·). In turn,
Πi
′′(µi) < 0 means that Π is strictly concave at the maximum, so the maximum must be unique.
Otherwise there is no Πi
′(µ) = 0 for µ ∈ (µ, µ∗). If r − c(µ∗) > 0 then it is maximum, since
a supplier can earn inﬁnite expected proﬁts. If r − c(µ∗) ≤ 0, then by inspection of (7) we see
Πi
′(µ∗) < 0. Furthermore Πi′(µ) < 0 for all µ ∈ (µ, µ∗), otherwise there would be an interior
solution. Thus the last mutually exclusive case is µi = µ. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof First we show that, given symmetric suppliers, there exists no asymmetric pure-strategy
equilibrium. By contradiction, consider the quality levels of two suppliers, j and k, in an
asymmetric equilibrium and, without loss of generality, suppose µ ≤ µk < µj.
Letting ci(·) ≡ c(·), for arbitrary supplier i we note that r − c(µ) = 0 implies that µj < µ,
since µj is an equilibrium solution, and inspection of (10) shows that Π
m
j
′(µ) < 0. Similarly, the
fact that µ ≤ µk < µj implies that Πmj ′(µj) = 0, since µj ∈ (µ, µ) is an interior-point solution
for the equilibrium. Thus, we have Πmk
′(µk) ≤ Πmj ′(µj) = 0.
We can write the ﬁrst order conditions (10) as:
nfi(1− fi)
µ∗ − µi
[
(r − c(µi)) − µ
∗ − µi
1 − fi c
′(µi)
]
= 0 (22)
nfi(1− fi)
µ∗ − µi
[
(r − c(µi)) − (µ
∗ − µi) ∑ml=1(µ∗ − µl)−1∑
l =i(µ∗ − µl)−1
c′(µi)
]
= 0 . (23)
In turn, letting δ

=
∑
{i:i=j,k}(µ∗−µi)−1, we can rewrite the term in square brackets within (23)
and rearrange terms to deﬁne
g(µ1, µ2)

= (r − c(µ1)) −
(
µ∗ − µ2
δ (µ∗ − µ2) + 1 + (µ
∗ − µ1)
)
c′(µ1) (24)
for arbitrary suppliers 1 and 2. Note that Πmk
′(µk) ≤ Πmj ′(µj) = 0 implies that g(µk, µj) ≤
g(µj, µk) = 0 as well, since the terms outside of the square brackets in (23) are positive.
At the same time, note that for any µ1 < µ
∗, µ2 < µ∗, and convex, increasing c(·), we have
∂g
∂µ1
= − (µ∗ − µ1) c′′(µ1) ≤ 0 and ∂g
∂µ2
=
c′(µ1)
(δ (µ∗ − µ2) + 1)2 > 0 . (25)
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This implies that g(µj, µk) ≤ g(µk, µk) < g(µk, µj), which contradicts g(µk, µj) ≤ g(µj, µk) =
0. Thus, given symmetric competitors there cannot be an asymmetric equilibrium.
Second we show that, given all equilibria are symmetric, there exists at most one equilibrium
that satisﬁes the ﬁrst order conditions. Since the equilibrium is symmetric we let fi = 1/m and
µi = µ for all i, and we rewrite ﬁrst order conditions (10) as follows:
Πm′(µ) =
(
m− 1
m2
) (
n
µ∗ − µ
)[
(r − c(µ))− m
m− 1 (µ
∗ − µ) c′(µ)
]
= 0 . (26)
Thus, the ﬁrst order conditions are satisﬁed if and only if the terms in the square brackets sum
to zero, or equivalently if g(µ)

= c(µ) +
(
m
m−1
)
(µ∗ − µ) c′(µ) = r. Diﬀerentiating g(µ) and
collecting terms, we see that
g′(µ) =
1
m
c′(µ) +
(
m
m− 1
)
(µ∗ − µ) c′′(µ) (27)
is positive for all µ < µ∗, since c(·) is increasing and convex. Thus there can be at most one µ
for which Πm′(µ) = 0.
Finally, recall that r − c(µ) = 0 implies that Πm′(µ) < 0. If there is a µ̂ ∈ (µ, µ) such that
Πm′(µ̂) = 0, then Πm′(µ) < 0 for all µ ∈ (µ̂, µ], Πm′(µ) > 0 for all µ ∈ [µ, µ̂), and there is exactly
one equilibrium. Otherwise, Πm′(µ) < 0 for all µ ∈ (µ, µ], and µ is the unique equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof When ci(·) = αic(·), we can write the ﬁrst order conditions (10) as
(r − αic(µi))n fi (1− fi)
µ∗ − µi − αic
′(µi)n fi = 0 . (28)
Part (i). Proof by contradiction. Assume that there exists an equilibrium with suppliers j and
k in which αj < αk but µj = µk and Π
m
j
′(µj) = Πmk
′(µk) = 0. Then the only diﬀerence between
the ﬁrst order conditions of j and k are the α terms. Furthermore, since c(·) is positive and
increasing, all terms in (28) are positive, so it must be the case that Πmj
′(µj) > Πmk
′(µk), a
contradiction.
Part (ii). For m = 2, we assume α1 < α2 and rewrite the ﬁrst order conditions (28) for
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arbitrary supplier i as follows:
n fi αi
[
(r/αi − c(µi)) 1− fi
µ∗ − µi − c
′(µi)
]
= n fi αi
[
r/αi − c(µi)
(µ∗ − µi) + (µ∗ − µj) − c
′(µi)
]
, (29)
since 1 − fi = fj = (µ∗−µi)(µ∗−µi) + (µ∗−µj) . Furthermore, Πmi
′(µi) = 0 if and only if the term in square
brackets equals zero, or equivalently when
r = αi c(µi)) + αi c
′(µi) (µ∗ − µi + µ∗ − µj) . (30)
Since c(·) is positive and increasing, α1 < α2 implies that µ1 > µ2 is necessary to satisfy
Πm1
′(µ1) = Πm2
′(µ2) = 0. Thus lower costs prompt supplier 1 to oﬀer higher average quality.
Finally we show that equilibrium proﬁts must be higher for supplier 1. By contradiction,
suppose that α1 < α2 and µ1 > µ2 but that Π
m
1 (µ1) ≤ Πm2 (µ2). Noting that µ1 > µ2 implies
f2 < 1/2 < f1, we have Π
m
2 (µ2) = (r−α2c(µ2))n f2 < (r−α2c(µ2))n 12 < (r−α1c(µ2))n 12 .
Thus, supplier 1 could have earned higher proﬁts than supplier 2 simply by lowering its quality
level from µ1 to µ2, and µ1 must not have been proﬁt maximizing in the ﬁrst place. 
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof We rewrite (10) as follows:
Πmi
′(µi) = nfi(1− fi)
[
r − ci(µi)
µ∗ − µi −
c′i(µi)
1− fi
]
= nfi(1− fi)
[
r − ci(µi)
µ∗ − µi − c
′
i(µi) −
fi
1− fi c
′
i(µi)
]
.(31)
The ﬁrst order conditions are satisﬁed if and only if the term in square brackets equals zero.
Part (i). For any ﬁxed µi, the term in square brackets is strictly less than the value of the
analogous expression for unilateral action (8), since fi ∈ (0, 1) and ci(·) is increasing. Note that
the actual equilibrium value of fi does not matter, as long it is positive. Thus, when µi < µ̂i, the
unilateral optimum, we have Πmi
′(µ̂i) < Π′i(µ̂i) = 0, so µ
m
i ∈ [µi, µ̂i). Similarly, , when µ̂i = µi,
then Πmi
′(µ
i
) < Π′i(µi) ≤ 0, and µi is optimal in the oligopoly equilibrium as well.
Part (ii). We recall from (3) that fi = 1/(1 + (µ
∗ − µi)∆) and write the term in square
brackets in (31) as
g(µi,∆) =
r − ci(µi)
µ∗ − µi − ci
′(µi) − 1
(µ∗ − µi)∆ ci
′(µi) (32)
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with partial derivative
∂ g
∂µi
=
r − ci(µi) − ci′(µi)(µ∗ − µi)
(µ∗ − µi)2 − ci
′′(µi) − ci
′(µi)
(µ∗ − µi)2∆ −
ci
′′(µi)
(µ∗ − µi)∆ (33)
=
1
µ∗ − µi g(µi,∆) − ci
′′(µi)
(
1− 1
(µ∗ − µi)∆
)
(34)
Note that Πmi
′(µi, µ−i) = 0 implies g(µi,∆) = 0, which in turn implies
∂ g(µi,∆)
∂ µi
< 0. Therefore
the inverse of the partial derivative exists at g(µi,∆) = 0, and by the Implicit Function Theorem
there is mapping from ∆ to the µi that solves g(µi,∆) = 0 and is continuously diﬀerentiable
at ∆. Call this function µ(∆).
Now in three steps we show that the sequence {µmi , µm+1i , . . .} converges to µ̂i. First, since
µ(∆) is continuous at (µ,∆), then for any ε > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such for all |∆′ −∆| < δ,
|µ(∆′)− µ(∆)| < ε. Second, call the equilibrium value of ∆ for m suppliers ∆m and note that
(m− 1)
(µ∗ − µ) ≤ ∆
m =
∑
j =i
(µ∗ − µj)−1 ≤ (m− 1)
(µ∗ − µ) . (35)
Therefore, for any δ > 0 there exists an m∗ > 0 such that for all m,n ≥ m∗, |1/∆m−1/∆n| < δ.
Together, these two facts imply that for any ε > 0 there exists an m∗ such that for all m,n ≥ m∗,
|µ(∆m) − µ(∆n)| < ε. Thus, the sequence {µmi = µ(∆m), µm+1i = µ(∆m+1), . . .} converges.
Third, the fact that the sequence converges to µ̂i can be seen by comparing (32) to (8) and
noting that: 1) c(µi)
µ∗−µi ∈ (0, r/(µ∗ − µi)] for all µi ∈ [µi, µi]; and 2) limm→∞ 1/∆m = 0.
Part (iii). From Proposition 3 we know that symmetric suppliers will ﬁnd a unique, sym-
metric equilibrium, and we can rewrite the term within the square brackets of (31) as follows:
r − ci(µi)
µ∗ − µi − c
′
i(µi) −
1
m− 1 c
′
i(µi) . (36)
Again, note that Πmi
′(µi) = 0 if and only if (36) evaluates to zero. Now suppose for some m that
µi satisﬁes these ﬁrst order conditions and is the unique, symmetric equilibrium. Then given
m + 1 suppliers and the same µi, the far right term decreases from c
′
i(µi)/(m− 1) to c′i(µi)/m,
and the entire expression becomes positive. Thus, Πmi
′(µi) = 0 ⇒ Πm+1i ′(µi) > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 6
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Proof The ﬁrst order conditions for (15) are
(r − ci)λ fi (1− fi)
µ∗ − µi −
ci
µ2i
= 0 (37)
(r/ci − 1)λ = µ
∗ − µi
µ2i
1
fi (1− fi) . (38)
Similarly, we can use (15) to write “proﬁts are greater than zero” as follows:
(r/ci − 1)λ ≥ − 1
µi fi
. (39)
Then together (38) and (39) imply that a necessary condition for supplier i to have positive
proﬁts in equilibrium is
µ∗ − µi
µ2i
1
fi (1− fi) ≥ −
1
µi fi
⇐⇒ − µ
∗ − µi
µi
≥ 1 − fi = fj , (40)
since −µi > 0.
When m = 2 we have fj =
(µ∗−µi)
(µ∗−µi) + (µ∗−µj) , so substituting for fj on the right hand side and
rearranging terms we obtain µj ≤ 2µ∗ as the necessary condition for i to be proﬁtable. This
holds for i = 1, 2.
Next, using the ﬁrst order conditions (38) for i and j, we can deﬁne µj in terms of µi as
follows:
µ∗ − µi
µ2i
1
fi (1− fi) =
µ∗ − µj
µ2j
1
fj (1− fj) ⇐⇒
µ∗ − µi
µ2i
=
µ∗ − µj
µ2j
(41)
since for m = 2, the two market shares add up to one, and fi (1−fi) = fj (1−fj). Rearranging
terms, we then have the following sequence of equivalent equalities: µ2j (µ
∗ − µi) = µ2i (µ∗ −
µj) ⇐⇒ (µ2j − µ2i )µ∗ = µ2j µi − µ2i µj ⇐⇒ (µj − µi) (µj + µi)µ∗ = µi µj (µj − µi) ⇐⇒
(µj + µi)µ
∗ = µi µj ⇐⇒ µj = − µ∗ µiµ∗−µi .
Finally we demonstrate that we cannot simultaneously satisfy µi ≤ 2µ∗, µj ≤ 2µ∗, and
µj = −µ∗ µi / (µ∗ − µi). Suppose that µj ≤ 2µ∗. Then − µ∗ µiµ∗−µi ≤ 2µ∗ ⇐⇒ −µ∗ µi ≤
2µ∗ (µ∗ − µi) ⇐⇒ µ∗ µi ≤ 2µ∗2 ⇐⇒ µi ≥ 2µ∗, since µ∗ < 0. Thus, the necessary
conditions (µj ≤ 2µ∗) for both suppliers to have (strictly) positive proﬁts cannot hold when
µj = µi. 
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Proof of Proposition 7
Proof We begin with (38). With symmetric data and equilibrium µi = µ and fi = 1/m for all
i, and the ﬁrst order conditions become
Πmi
′(µ) = (r − c)λ fi (1− fi)
µ∗ − µ −
c
µ2
= (r − c)λ (m− 1)/m
2
µ∗ − µ −
c
µ2
. (42)
Rearranging terms and substituting −µ−1 for (r/c−1), we can verify that Πmi ′(µ) = 0 whenever[
− 1
µ
m−1
m2
]
µ2 + µ − µ∗ = 0.
The roots of this quadratic equation are µm
2
2 (m−1)
(
1 ±
√
1 − 4
(
m−1
m2
) (
µ∗
µ
))
, and it is not
diﬃcult to verify that for m ≥ 2 they are real whenever µ < µ∗. Furthermore, when µ < µ∗ it
can be veriﬁed that the less negative root is strictly greater than mµ and the more negative root
is strictly less than mµ. Thus, the more negative root µ = mµ
[
m
2 (m−1)
(
1 +
√
1 − 4
(
m−1
m2
) (
µ∗
µ
))]
,
is the unique symmetric equilibrium that is proﬁtable. 
Proof of Corollary 2
Proof Let µ(m) and µ(m+1) be the equilibrium quality levels oﬀered for m and m+1 suppliers.
Then using (18) to verify that µ(m + 1) < µ(m), we check that
µ(m + 1)2
2m
1 +
√√√√1 − 4 ( m
(m + 1)2
) (
µ∗
µ
) < µm2
2 (m− 1)
1 +
√√√√1 − 4 (m− 1
m2
) (
µ∗
µ
)
if and only if1 +
√√√√1 − 4 ( m
(m + 1)2
) (
µ∗
µ
) > ( m3
(m + 1)2 (m− 1)
) 1 +
√√√√1 − 4 (m− 1
m2
) (
µ∗
µ
) .
Then it is not diﬃcult to verify that m
3
(m+1)2 (m−1) < 1 for m ≥ 2. In turn, it is suﬃcient if1 +
√√√√1 − 4 ( m
(m + 1)2
) (
µ∗
µ
) >
1 +
√√√√1 − 4 (m− 1
m2
) (
µ∗
µ
)
or that
1 − 4
(
m
(m + 1)2
) (
µ∗
µ
)
> 1 − 4
(
m− 1
m2
) (
µ∗
µ
)
⇐⇒ m
3
(m + 1)2 (m− 1) < 1 ,
which, again is satisﬁed for m ≥ 2. Thus as m increases, µ decreases. 
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